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ABSTRACT
Word Embedding Techniques for Malware Classification
by Aniket Chandak
Word embeddings are often used in natural language processing as a means to
quantify relationships between words. More generally, these same word embedding
techniques can be used to quantify relationships between features. In this paper, we
conduct a series of experiments that are designed to determine the effectiveness of word
embedding in the context of malware classification. First, we conduct experiments
where hidden Markov models (HMM) are directly applied to opcode sequences. These
results serve to establish a baseline for comparison with our subsequent word embedding
experiments. We then experiment with word embedding vectors derived from HMMs—
a technique that we refer to as HMM2Vec. In another set of experiments, we generate
vector embeddings based on principal component analysis, which we refer to as
PCA2Vec. And, for a third set of word embedding experiments, we consider the well-
known neural network based technique, Word2Vec. In each of these word embedding
experiments, we derive feature embeddings based on opcode sequences for malware
samples from a variety of different families. We show that in most cases, we obtain
improved classification accuracy using feature embeddings, as compared to our baseline
HMM experiments. These results provide strong evidence that word embedding
techniques can play a useful role in feature engineering within the field of malware
analysis.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
In this paper, we classify malware samples by applying machine learning techniques
to engineered features. The feature engineering techniques themselves involve machine
learning, that is, we apply machine learning to generate features. The motivation here
is that machine learning can possibly derive more useful features from the available
data, and hence classification based on such features may perform better than using
the raw features. In this research, we study the effectiveness of such machine learning
based feature engineering in the context of malware classification.
Malware is malicious software designed with the intention to harm the computer
system or obtain unauthorized access to a computer system [1]. Malware exists on
virtually all computer systems, including laptops, smartphones, and software services
such as email and internet banking. In recent years, the increase in the number
and importance of such computing systems has created many new opportunities for
malware-based attacks. This has led to the development of a variety of advanced
malware types.
Research aimed at improved detection and classification of malware is a critical
topic in information security. Malware samples that belong to the same family should
show some similar characteristics and behavior. Classifying malware into its family is
a fundamental problem in malware analysis.
Existing approaches to detect malware include behavior-based and signature-
based detection. These approaches have various advantages and disadvantages [2]. For
example, signature-based detection is relatively fast and efficient, but it fails to detect
malware that has not been seen before, and many obfuscation techniques can defeat
signature scanning. On the other hand, behavior-based detection can detect new
malware, but such approaches are often costly and have unacceptable false positive
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rates. Recent advances in learning techniques and the availability of large datasets has
resulted in significant improvement over traditional malware detection approaches.
In this research, we consider the use of word embedding techniques based on
opcode features for malware classification. We consider embedding techniques based
on hidden Markov models (HMM) [3], principal component analysis (PCA) [4], and
the neural network based technique, Word2Vec [5]. We refer to the techniques based
on HMM and PCA as HMM2Vec and PCA2Vec, respectively. For all of the word
embedding techniques considered, we generate the embeddings based on opcode
sequences, and we experiment with a substantial malware dataset that includes
samples from seven different malware families. For each embedding technique, we
also consider an additional feature engineering step, where PCA is used to reduce the
dimensionality of the feature embeddings prior to the classification step. We refer
to this method as 𝑘-PCA where 𝑘 represents the dimension of the reduced feature
vectors. In all cases, for classification, we experiment with 𝑘-nearest neighbors (𝑘NN),
multilayer perceptrons (MLP), random forest (RF), and support vector machines
(SVM).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we provide
background on malware detection and the various machine learning techniques used in
this research. In Chapter 3 we discuss our dataset and experimental results. Finally,




Malware is one of the most alarming and crucial threats existing in the era
of the internet. As per the Internet Threat Security Report 2019 [6], there is an
increase of 25% compared to the previous year in the number of attack groups using
malware to disrupt the business of the organization. As per California Data Breach
Report 2016 [7], malware has contributed to 54% of breaches and 90% of total records
breaches which accounts for 44 million records breach in the year 2012–2016. As
per the Kaspersky Security Statistics 2017 [8], 29.4% of personal computers suffer a
minimum of one malware attack over the year. Overall statistics imply that malware
are increasing rapidly in terms of momentum, quantity, and variation.
Various factors like large volume, obfuscation, detection speed, detection of the
virtual environment make it difficult to analyze and detect malware [9]. Every day,
thousands of new malware are generated and it is difficult to analyze the enormous
volume of data. Obfuscation is a technique used by malware creators to make it difficult
to read the content of malware code, e.g., by adding a dead code [9]. Advancement
in malware creation has reduced the speed of malware detection. Malware can cause
damage if detection is delayed. Malware detection plays an important role in the
information security domain because of these challenges.
Many companies and software products are dependent on conventional methods
to detect malware. These methods can be classified into two types, signature-based
detection, and behavioral-based detection. Antivirus companies use a signature-based
method to detect malware and protect legitimate users from attack [2]. The signature-
based method is based on the identification of a unique pattern in a file [10]. It refers
to the database of existing known malware for pattern matching to classify a file as
malware [2]. Signature extraction is a complex activity because it involves manual
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intervention. In this method, detection is faster but can be easily bypassed using
obfuscation. Obfuscation is adding a dead code into the file. This method fails to
detect new malware which are not part of the database.
Another method, behavioral-based detection is based on identifying the actions
performed instead of a pattern [2]. When the file performs any action, which does not
fall under normal behavior, this method triggers an alarm for the file. This method
can detect obfuscated malware, however, the speed of detection is slower because of
the complexity to detect actions. Limitations of conventional methods can be defeated
with machine learning based solutions. In the following section, we describe previous
work done in the malware detection and classification using machine learning.
2.1 Previous Work
Effectiveness of the machine learning algorithm not only depends on the task
at hand but also the characteristics of features. In malware classification, a file can
be represented with features associated with it such as opcode, bytecode, API calls,
and permissions, etc. Features can be used to perform analysis using a compatible
machine learning algorithm. Opcode has been used to detect the malware based on a
count of opcode in the file [11]. An opcode is a machine-level instruction of a program.
Support vector machine trained on 20 most frequently used opcodes as a feature with
100 malware and benign sample to achieve a 96.67% success rate.
In [12], the authors experimented with 67 malware and 20 non-malicious files and
extracted opcodes from these files. Statistics in the experiments conclude that opcodes
can be used as a feature to differentiate between malware and non-malware [12].
Another research in [13] achieved good results by using API calls as a feature. API can
be defined as functionality or action performed by a program. They experimented with
3536 malicious programs and extracted API features using a sandbox deriving accuracy
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as 0.87 in malware detection [13]. Extracting API calls from any file is a difficult task
as compared to extracting opcode. As the time efficiency is an important factor in
designing malware detector, the opcode is a better choice as a feature compared to
API calls.
Another research in [14] used opcode sequence as a feature for malware detection.
Experiments in the research consider 𝑛-gram opcode sequence with values of 𝑛 = 2, 3, 4.
They introduced the Markov blanket for feature selection from the large 𝑛-gram feature
set. Mutual information value is used for selecting the feature and reduced feature
size by 99%Ȧfter feature selection, classifiers trained on hidden Markov model for
five malware families contributing to 1200 malware files and 194 benign files. They
achieved 99% precision and 98% sensitivity.
There have been researches in feature engineering using machine learning tech-
niques. Word2Vec is used for feature extraction for malware [15]. In this research,
malware is treated as a language for semantic analysis using language modeling tech-
niques. They used the Word2Vec model to extract contextual information from the
opcode sequence of malware. Learned contextual information is used as a feature
for classification using 𝑘NN. Distance between vectors is calculated using the word
movers distance algorithm in 𝑘NN classification. This method achieved 95% accuracy
for 9 malware families. The research concludes that word embedding techniques such
as Word2Vec are effective in understanding the contextual information in malware
and word embeddings act as an effective feature for classification. In this research, the
author does not consider classification methods other than 𝑘NN, also this research is
focused on language modeling using Word2Vec and does not explore other language
modeling techniques.
Another research in [16] used Word2Vec to generate the feature vector. The
opcode sequence is used for training the Word2Vec for feature extraction. A deep
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neural network is trained using features for malware classification. The proposed
method considers large number of opcodes in the range 50 to 200 and vector embedding
of length in the range 250 to 750. Binary classification experiments are performed
on 1200 benign and 1200 malicious samples. Proposed experiments can be further
extended to cases with less number of opcodes and shorter embedding length. The
research shows that malware can be treated as a language for semantic analysis.
In [17], the proposed method uses a similar approach based on Word2Vec with an
interesting combination of TF-IDF. The sequence of API syscall is used as a feature in
the research. Word2Vec embeddings represent contextual information of feature and
TF-IDF vector represents relevancy of feature. In the proposed method, Word2Vec
embeddings of the feature are multiplied by the TF-IDF weight of respective features.
This additional step makes contextual information stronger for a more relevant API
syscall. Further, this information is used to perform classification using 𝑘NN, RF, and
SVM. The limitation of the proposed solution is the use of dynamic features.
Word2Vec embeddings are used as a feature for training the BLSTM [18]. Bi-
directional LSTM is improved version of LSTM [19]. The experiments achieved good
accuracy for malware detection. In [20], the author proposed the word embedding
method based on the graph. In this method, the graph is generated using opcode
information. This graph is projected into vector space to generate word embeddings.
In the classification task, graph generation shows slower performance.
In [21], the author states that word embedding techniques based on traditional
machine learning methods are comparable to a neural-network approach. Their work
shows that word embeddings can be generated using a matrix of pointwise mutual
information (PMI) of the respective word and principal component analysis (PCA).
In this research, we experiment with a similar approach based on the PMI matrix for
generating word embeddings for malware.
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In the survey of related work, we understood that opcode acts as a good feature
in malware classification. We learned that machine learning techniques based on word
embedding can be used for feature engineering. However, there are no relevant studies
based on HMM models to extract word embeddings.
2.2 Background on Machine Learning Techniques
In this section, we present various machine learning techniques that are used
in the experiments discussed in Chapter 3. We introduce HMMs and PCA, which
form the basis for the word embedding techniques that we refer to as HMM2Vec and
PCA2Vec, respectively. Finally, we introduce four classification techniques used in
our experiments.
We also discuss HMM2Vec, PCA2Vec, and the neural network based word
embedding technique, Word2Vec, in detail. For our experiments in Chapter 3, we use
this three word embedding techniques along with other techniques to generate features
vectors. Feature vectors are used in the classification experiments for comparison.
2.2.1 Hidden Markov Models
Hidden Markov model (HMM) is a machine learning model based on a sta-
tistical Markov model representing the probability distribution on the observation
sequence [22]. HMM is a discrete hill-climbing algorithm represented using initial
state probabilities, observation probabilities in hidden states, and state transition
probabilities. Information related to the working of hidden Markov model, applications,
and algorithm is mentioned in [22], which include detailed algorithms or Rabiner’s
classic paper [23].
2.2.2 Principal Component Analysis
Principal component analysis (PCA) is a machine learning technique usually used
in dimensionality reduction problems [4]. Trained PCA represents the eigenspace
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where original data can be projected. This technique does not eliminate any feature
but packs the entire feature in a more concentrated form with fewer dimensions. More
information on PCA is mentioned in [4] and also to understand the math in detail
behind the PCA refer [24]. The discussion at [25] also provides more insight into PCA.
2.2.3 Word Embedding Techniques
Word embeddings are often used in natural language processing as they provide
a way to quantify relationships between words. Here, we use word embedding to
generate higher-level features for malware classification.
In this section, we discuss three distinct word embedding techniques. First, we
consider word embeddings derived from trained HMMs, which we refer to as HMM2Vec.
Then we consider a word embedding technique based on PCA, which we call PCA2Vec.
Finally, we discuss the popular neural network based technique Word2Vec.
2.2.3.1 HMM2Vec
We will discuss one simple example before jumping to word embedding, where
we consider the letters instead of words and will call this approach as Letter2Vec.
HMM model represented with three matrices 𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝜋 which represents hidden
state transition probabilities, observation probability distribution in hidden states and
initial state probabilities respectively with row stochastic property. Notation-wise, 𝑁
represents the number of hidden states, 𝑀 represents count of distinct symbol in
observation, and length of observation symbol is represented by 𝑇 . Users can define
the value of 𝑁 whereas 𝑀 and 𝑇 are decided by the training data.
Consider the experiment where we train the HMM on English text with each letter
as an observation symbol and ignore the case-sensitivity and characters other than
alphabetical letters. Thus 𝑀 = 27 (letters plus word-space), and we choose 𝑁 = 2
hidden states, and 𝑇 = 50,000 length of observation sequence. Table 1 represents 𝐵ᵀ
8
Table 1: Initial and Final 𝐵ᵀ
Observation Initial Final
a 0.03735 0.03909 0.13845 0.00075
b 0.03408 0.03537 0.00000 0.02311
c 0.03455 0.03537 0.00062 0.05614
d 0.03828 0.03909 0.00000 0.06937
e 0.03782 0.03583 0.21404 0.00000
f 0.03922 0.03630 0.00000 0.03559
g 0.03688 0.04048 0.00081 0.02724
h 0.03408 0.03537 0.00066 0.07278
i 0.03875 0.03816 0.12275 0.00000
j 0.04062 0.03909 0.00000 0.00365
k 0.03735 0.03490 0.00182 0.00703
l 0.03968 0.03723 0.00049 0.07231
m 0.03548 0.03537 0.00000 0.03889
n 0.03735 0.03909 0.00000 0.11461
o 0.04062 0.03397 0.13156 0.00000
p 0.03595 0.03397 0.00040 0.03674
q 0.03641 0.03816 0.00000 0.00153
r 0.03408 0.03676 0.00000 0.10225
s 0.04062 0.04048 0.00000 0.11042
t 0.03548 0.03443 0.01102 0.14392
u 0.03922 0.03537 0.04508 0.00000
v 0.04062 0.03955 0.00000 0.01621
w 0.03455 0.03816 0.00000 0.02303
x 0.03595 0.03723 0.00000 0.00447
y 0.03408 0.03769 0.00019 0.02587
z 0.03408 0.03955 0.00000 0.00110
space 0.03688 0.03397 0.33211 0.01298
of trained HMM [26], Suppose that we represent a letter using the corresponding row
of the converged matrix 𝐵ᵀ in the last two columns of Table 1. Suppose that for a
given letter ℓ, we define its Letter2Vec representation 𝑉 (ℓ) to be the corresponding
row of the converged matrix 𝐵ᵀ in the last two columns of Table 1. Then, for example,
𝑉 (𝑎) = (0.13845, 0.00075) 𝑉 (𝑒) = (0.21404, 0.00000)
𝑉 (𝑠) = (0.00000, 0.11042) 𝑉 (𝑡) = (0.01102, 0.14392)
(1)
These embedding can be used to calculate the cosine distance between the vectors.
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The cosine similarity of vectors 𝑋 and 𝑌 is given by









Where 𝑋 = (𝑋0, 𝑋1, . . . , 𝑋𝑛−1) and 𝑌 = (𝑌0, 𝑌1, . . . , 𝑌𝑛−1) are the vectors. As the
cosine similarity represents the cosine angle between the vector, a value closer to 1
represents a similar vector and vice versa. Here if we see, for the letter embedding in
equation (1), vowels “a” and “e” are close as cos(𝑉 (𝑎), 𝑉 (𝑒)) = 0.9999 whereas vowel
“a” and the consonant “t” are apart as cos(𝑉 (𝑎), 𝑉 (𝑡)) = 0.0817. These results show
that letter embedding carries important information related to the letter. Similar to
Letter2Vec embedding, HMM can be trained on observation sequence consisting of
words and define the embedding using the resulting 𝐵 matrix.
While HMM2Vec is possible to train there are some limitations to training. The
most critical limitation is as HMM is based on a Markov model of order one, therefore
the resulting vectors of HMM will have limited context information. The state of the
art approach of Word2Vec is trained on data corresponding to 𝑀 = 10,000, 𝑁 = 300,
and 𝑇 = 109, and training HMM would be difficult because of the order of 𝑁2𝑇 work
in Baum-Welch re-estimation.
2.2.3.2 PCA2Vec
Another technique in this research for generating word embedding is to apply
PCA on a special matrix. This special matrix used is constructed based on pointwise
mutual information (PMI) using window size 𝑊 . To construct a PMI matrix, we
calculate 𝑃 (𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗) for all pairs of words (𝑤𝑖, 𝑤𝑗) that occur within a window 𝑊 of
each other within out observation sequence dataset. In the process compute 𝑃 (𝑤𝑖) for
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each individual word 𝑤𝑖. Then we define the PMI matrix as
𝑋 = {𝑥𝑖𝑗} = log
𝑃 (𝑤𝑗, 𝑤𝑖)
𝑃 (𝑤𝑖)𝑃 (𝑤𝑗)
We represent column 𝑖 of 𝑋, denoted 𝑋𝑖, as the feature vector for word 𝑤𝑖
Next step is to perform PCA training on these 𝑋𝑖 feature vectors, and then project
the feature vectors 𝑋𝑖 onto the resulting eigenspace. When projecting the feature
vector into eigenspace, length 𝑁 of final feature vector will be decided by choosing
the 𝑁 dominant eigenvalues. Similar properties of these embedding vectors is shown
in [27] and also some research claims [28] that eliminating eigenvectors with dominant
eigenvalues is beneficial to gain more information in embedding vectors. More details
on using PCA to generate word embeddings can be found in [28] and [27].
2.2.3.3 Word2Vec
Word2Vec is a famous word embedding technique based on a shallow neural
network which can be used for embedding any feature into a high-dimensional space.
After the training of neural network, words that are more similar in context will
be close to each other compared to words that are not similar in context. Another
surprising thing about these embedded vectors is that they hold algebraic property.
For example, according to [5], if we let
𝑤0 = “king”, 𝑤1 = “man”, 𝑤2 = “woman”, 𝑤3 = “queen”
and we assume 𝑉 (𝑤𝑖) to be the Word2Vec embedding of 𝑤𝑖, then it is observed
that 𝑉 (𝑤3) is closest to
𝑉 (𝑤0)− 𝑉 (𝑤1) + 𝑉 (𝑤2)
And the closeness is defined by the cosine similarity between the vectors. Word2Vec
and HMM2Vec hold similarity in the ways it is being used. In both cases, we are not
interested directly in the model itself but rather in the learning of the model, i.e., we
are more interested in model representation after training.
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A general discussion of Word2Vec can be found in [29] and a good introduction is
given in [30]. The original paper describing Word2Vec is given in [5] and improvements
on original implementation are given in [31].
2.2.4 Classifiers
Features generated by word embedding techniques are used to classify malware
into the respective family. Machine learning based classifiers can be used to analyze
the quality of generated features. There are many existing machine learning based
classifiers. In the research presented in this paper, we consider four different classifiers,
namely, 𝑘-nearest neighbors (𝑘NN), multilayer perceptron (MLP), random forest (RF),
and support vector machine (SVM). Experiments discussed in Chapter 3 use these
classifiers.
2.2.4.1 𝑘-Nearest Neighbors
One of the simplest machine learning techniques is 𝑘-nearest neighbors where
classification is based on the vote of nearest 𝑘 samples in training data. The distance
measure formula can be Euclidean distance, Manhatten distance or any other distance
formula. This is also a lazy machine learning technique as it does not involve any
training phase but at the same time, more training samples make the scoring phase
slower. More information on 𝑘NN can be found in [26].
2.2.4.2 Random Forest
Random forest (RF) is the technique used to overcome the overfitting problem
in the decision tree by generalizing the decision tree algorithm. An RF consists of
multiple decision trees using subsets of features and samples and uses the majority
vote of decision trees to make a final decision on classification. RF and classification
using RF are discussed in more detail in [26] and [32].
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2.2.4.3 Support Vector Machine
Support vector machine is the type of supervised learning method whose goal is
to learn hyperplane to separate the input labeled data. This separating hyperplane
is capable of maximizing the separation between classes and can work in higher
dimensional space with the help of a kernel trick. More information on support vector
machines and the kernel are given in [26]
2.2.5 Multilayer Perceptron
Multilayer perceptron (MLP) is a feedforward neural network and is one of the
simplest neural network which can be used for classification and regression [33]. It
consists of an input layer, an output layer, and multiple hidden layers. It learns the
best value for weights in those layers to minimize the error. More details on the
architecture and working of neural networks are given in [33] and [26]
2.2.5.1 Last Word on Classification Techniques
MLP and SVM are related as they share some similarities in the approach they
work. Both of them are capable of creating nonlinear decision boundaries as in SVM
nonlinear kernel can be used whereas MLP learns the non-linearity using the data.
This implies MLPs have an advantage as there is no need to specify correct kernel
and model can learn that based on data. On the other hand, MLP requires more
computation and data to train as it has more things to learn than comparable SVM.
Another observation is the similarity between 𝑘NN and RF. They both are the same
in terms of algorithm based on neighbors but there is a structural difference in both
the approach to look at neighbors [26].
Thus, considering the similarity we expect that 𝑘NN and RF to show similar
results. Also, SVM and MLP should be closely related in terms of results. This
relation can be used for a sanity check of experiments. If the results for SVM and
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MLP have a significant difference then we should investigate experiments further. On
the other hand, if the results are significantly different for SVM and RF then it should




In this chapter, we explain malware families considered in the research. Also, we
briefly discuss the dataset, machine learning techniques used for feature extraction
and classification.
3.1 Dataset
Malware families in Table 2 represent the dataset used for the experiments in this
study. In this research, 1000 samples are randomly selected from each of these families
to keep balance in the dataset and considers 7 malware families making 7000 samples
in total. These families have been used in many recent studies, including [34] and [35],
for example. Malware families in Table 2 are of different types. We will briefly discuss
each of these families used in our experiments.
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BHO — Malware in this family are capable of a range of malicious actions. These
actions can be specified by attacker [36].
CeeInject — Malware in this family are designed to avoid detection. Therefore many
families use it as a shield to avoid detection. For example, CeeInject can be used
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to obfuscate a bitcoin mining client, making it possible to be installed on the
user’s system without their knowledge or consent [37].
FakeRean — Malware in this family shows fake issues in a user’s system and ask
them to pay to clean the system [38].
OnLineGames — Malware in this family are used to steal information such as login
credentials of a user for online games and their keystroke activity [39].
Renos — Malware in this family states that the system has spyware and ask a user
to pay money to remove the mentioned spyware [40].
Vobfus — Malware in this family damages user’s computer by downloading other
malware and tweak the system configurations that can not be restored easily by
cleaning the downloaded malware [41].
Winwebsec — Malware in this family acts as an antivirus for the user’s system and
shows false information that the device has been compromised and asks a user
to pay money to clean the system [42].
3.2 Data Pre-processing
Malware samples in our dataset are executable files in raw form. Executable
malware samples are disassembled using objdump to extract features. Objdump is a
part of GNU Binutils in Linux which can be used to disassemble the executable. We
disassembled 7000 malware samples to extract the sequence of an opcode from the
executable file. A large number of distinct opcodes are present in disassembled code.
Considering all opcodes in experiments do not add value and increases the overhead
in the training of machine learning models. There are more than 200 different types
of opcodes and it is not efficient to use all the opcodes in the experiment. Previous
research in [11] considered the top 20 opcodes in malware classification. We calculated
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the top 20 opcodes in our dataset based on frequency. Based on the those, the opcode
sequence is filtered for 7000 samples. Figure 1 shows the top 20 opcodes and their





























































































Figure 1: Top 20 Opcodes












We conducted binary classification experiments discussed in Section 3.3.5.1 with
the top 20 and 30 opcodes. Figure A.19, and A.20 represents experiment result for
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a model trained on Renos family and tested against Onlinegames family. Results
show that there is no significant improvement in using the top 30 opcodes over top 20.
Based on these experiments and use of the top 20 opcode in [11], we select the top 20
opcodes.
3.3 Feature Engineering
In this section, we discuss the experiment for feature engineering using machine
learning. The features are used as input for classifiers discussed in Section 2.2.4. We
use multiple machine learning techniques to model the features for malware samples
in our dataset. The focus of this section is to explain experiments for HMM2Vec,
PCA2Vec, and Word2Vec. It also discusses the technique to reduce the dimension
of features using PCA based pipeline, referred to as 𝑘-PCA. To compare the results
of the proposed method, a simple baseline HMM score approach is used. We expect
the proposed technique based on word embedding to perform better than the baseline
approach.
3.3.1 HMM Score
First, we consider experiments based on HMMs and opcode sequences. We choose
these HMM-based experiments for the baseline approach for comparison. The opcode
feature for training HMM has shown good results in many studies [43, 44, 45, 46, 47].
In this experiment, we train the HMM model for 7 families. When training the HMM
model for given family, the observation sequence is generated by appending 10 random
samples. To avoid the convergence at local maxima, HMM is trained 10 times with
different initial values of 𝐴 and 𝐵 matrix to select the best model.
To create a feature vector, 500 random samples from each family are scored
using the HMM models. These scores from 7 HMM models form a feature vec-
tor. The position of score from a specific HMM model is fixed in the feature
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vector and does not change across samples. The feature vector will be repre-
sented as <BHO score, CeeInject score, OnLine Games score, Renos score,
Winwebsec score, FakeRean score, Vobfus score>. Here we generated 3500 la-
beled samples (500 from each family) with a feature vector of length 7.
3.3.2 HMM2Vec
Another technique we use for feature extraction is the hidden Markov model.
To train the hidden Markov model, an observation sequence and a number of states
parameter are required. The opcode sequence is treated as an observation sequence
in the HMM training. The remaining training parameters for HMM and respective
values are given in Table 4. The complete process of training the HMM2Vec is shown
in Figure 2.
Table 4: Parameters in HMM Training
Parameter Description Value
𝑇 Length of observation sequence 500 to 200000
𝑁 Number of states 2
𝑀 Number of observation symbol ≤ 20
Figure 2: HMM2Vec Feature Generation
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3.3.2.1 Adaptive Random Restart in HMM
HMM is a discrete hill climb algorithm. Therefore HMM training can sometimes
converge at local minima. To avoid convergence at local minima, HMM can be trained
from multiple starting points on hill, i.e., in our case with different initialization of
𝐴, 𝐵, and 𝜋 matrix. From those multiple initialization, consider the model which
reached the highest point on the hill and discard other models. This method is called
as random restarts in HMM training. In this method, random restarts represent
the number of models trained from different initialization. It is usually observed
that shorter observation sequence requires more random restarts compared to longer
observation sequence. Also, random restarts for longer observation sequence will take
more time to train, which is unnecessary if convergence is achieved earlier. To address
this issues, we implemented adaptive random restarts to ensure model convergence
in training. Adaptive indicates that a number of random restarts is decided based
on the length of the observation sequence. Table 5 represents the number of random
restarts based on length when training HMM.







Hmmlearn python library is used for training the HMM. It requires valid observa-
tion sequence represented as a sequence of numbers in range 0 to |𝑉 | − 1, where |𝑉 |
is the number of the distinct observation symbols, and each number exist at least
once in the observation sequence. The constraint in the library is to map observation
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symbol in 𝐵 matrix column with two dimensional array in python, for example, the
0th column represents state probabilities for observation symbol “0”. To satisfy the
constraint of the library with opcode sequence, it is required to map opcode with
number with help of mapping.
The opcode to digit mapping is not static for all observation sequences, i.e., we
generate new mapping for each observation sequence. Every sample does not have
all of the 20 opcodes. In cases, when opcode is absent in the observation sequence,
the use of static mapping will invalidate the observation sequence constraint. Hence
same static mapping can not be used for all samples. Consider static mapping is used
and ADD is mapped with number 3 and a sample in the dataset does not have the
ADD opcode, therefore number 3 will be missing in the observation sequence. This
observation sequence is invalid for hmmlearn training as per the constraint discussed
earlier. Hence we generate new mapping for each sample to represent opcode sequence
as a sequence of numbers in range 0 to |𝑉 | − 1.
3.3.2.3 Parallel Restarts in Hidden Markov Model
In this research, HMM is used to train around 7000 models. Training the HMM
is a computationally expensive. Adding the overhead of random restart on training
increases the execution time. All the random restart instances of training the HMM
are independent of each other. Available libraries to train the HMM do not consider
the parallel training of random restarts. We implemented the parallel version of HMM
training, which trains multiple models in parallel based on available CPU cores in
the system. The multiprocessing module in python is used to leverage the multiple
processors available in the system. Figure 3 shows that the parallel approach improves
the execution time for more random restarts compared to a sequential approach. The
improvement depends on the number of CPU cores and our experiment shows the
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parallel execution is 4 times faster with 8 core CPU than the serial execution. Initially,
the graph shows that the parallel approach is slower than the serial for small values
of the random restart. The reason is, overhead of dividing the task on CPU and
collecting back the results is more than execution itself for a few random restarts.
Figure 3: Parallel vs Serial Random Restarts
3.3.2.4 Vectorization of HMM
This step involves generating a feature vector from HMM which is consistent
across all the samples. To maintain consistency in a feature vector, a position in
the feature vector is fixed for a given feature. Any information from 𝐴 matrix or 𝐵
matrix in vectorization have a fixed position in a feature vector, for example, the
observational probability of MOV opcode in state 0 take a fixed position in feature
vector for every sample.
There are two challenges in maintaining consistency. First, the format of the
𝐵 matrix is not consistent across all the models, i.e., trained HMM model can have
different dimensions as a value of 𝑀 is not fixed for all samples. Also, the order of
columns in 𝐵 matrix is inconsistent, i.e., column number for given opcode is not fixed
𝐵 matrix. Second challenge is unknown state in the HMM as per the term “hidden.”
The MOV opcode in can converge in either state 0 or state 1 in a given sample.
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To solve these challenges, our HMM model vectorization code incorporates logical
steps. The first is to swap the rows in 𝐵 matrix if required to maintain consistency in
the state. We considered a specific opcode for which there is significant convergence in
one of the states. For every sample, if that opcode has convergence in state 0 then we
do not swap the state in the respective HMM model. If the matrix has convergence in
state 1 (another state) we swapped the rows in 𝐴 and 𝐵 matrix. After swapping the
convergence is consistent in state 0.
To solve the second challenge, we maintained the fixed mapping of opcode and
position in the feature vector. This mapping is the same throughout all the experiments
and does not change for any sample. This mapping is used in vectorization of the 𝐵
matrix. For the cases, when 𝐵 matrix has dimension less than 20, i.e., not all the
opcodes are present in the observation sequence, 0 is appended.
3.3.2.5 Results for HMM2Vec Versions
Three different versions of HMM2Vec considered are plain HMM with no random
restarts and no state swap, HMM with state swap and without 𝐴 matrix, and HMM
with random restarts. SVM based classification experiments were conducted on these
versions of feature vector with 𝑘-PCA reduction. Figure A.21, A.22, and A.23 in the
appendix represent the confusion matrices for the experiments. Experiment results in
0.79, 0.80, and 0.90 accuracy respectively for previously mentioned versions. It shows
that 𝐵 matrix does not contribute to feature and removing 𝐵 matrix from vector does
not reduce the accuracy. Also, the swapping states does not improve accuracy in a
considerable amount. The reason can be a high correlation of features within states
and relation is learned by the machine when classifying.
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3.3.3 Word2Vec
Word2Vec is another technique used in this research for feature engineering.
Word2Vec is most popularly used to learn word embedding with the help of the
shallow neural network. In this experiment, Word2Vec is trained using the opcode
sequence. After training the Word2Vec model, the feature vector is generated by
appending opcode embedding. If the opcode is missing in the observation sequence,
zero vector is appended, for example, append two zeros in feature vector for missing
opcode when the length of the embedding vector is 2.
To keep it consistent with HMM with two states, Word2Vec with the length of
embedding vector as 2 and window size as 10 is trained. We vectorize the trained
Word2Vec model by appending the embedding of opcodes in feature vector. The
length of this feature vector depends on the length parameter in the training of the
Word2Vec model.
Figure 4: Word2Vec Feature Generation
3.3.3.1 Code Implementation
For training Word2Vec, we used the gensim module in python [48]. Gensim allows
us to specify parameters such as window, size of embedding vector, and underlying
training algorithm. Continuous bag of words (CBOW) and skip-gram are options for
training algorithms in Word2Vec and the default training algorithm in the library is
CBOW. In our experiments, we use default CBOW for training Word2Vec.
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3.3.4 PCA2Vec
PCA2Vec is another technique used in this research for feature engineering. PMI
matrix of 20× 20 dimensions is calculated as our observation has a maximum of 20
distinct opcodes. For consistency with the HMM2Vec experiment discussed above, we
used the two eigenvectors and for consistency with the Word2Vec model above, we
used the window size of 𝑊 as 10 when constructing the PMI matrix. The resulting
projection into the eigenspace is 2× 20 which we vectorize to obtain the feature of
length 40.There is no library available to train PCA2Vec hence implemented python
code to generate PMI matrix as discussed in Section 2.2.3.2.
3.3.4.1 PCA2Vec Variation
In trained PCA, the eigenvector corresponding to bigger eigenvalues is most
influential. We experimented by eliminating eigenvectors with bigger eigenvalues.
Research claims the elimination of bigger eigenvalue can give better projection [28].
In this experiment, we select two eigenvectors to project features into 2-d space.
• Case 1: PCA2Vec with no elimination
• Case 2: PCA2Vec with the elimination of first eigenvalue
• Case 3: PCA2Vec with the elimination of first and second eigenvalue
These versions of features are used for classification using MLP classifier after finding
the best parameters in GridSearch.
Accuracy in Figure 5 shows that elimination of eigenvector corresponding to bigger
eigenvalues do not help to improve performance. Rather, it reduces the accuracy which
indicates that eigenvectors corresponding to bigger eigenvalues have more information.
3.3.5 𝑘-PCA
There is another novel approach we introduced called as 𝑘-PCA for feature























Figure 5: Regular PCA2Vec and Variants Accuracy
any feature engineering method to generate level 1 of the feature vector. The proposed
method reduces the dimensionality of the feature vector from level 1 to the number of
classes in the dataset. Figure 6 shows the process involved in feature engineering using
𝑘-PCA. We will discuss the steps involved in feature reduction by the 𝑘-PCA method.
Step 1 Generate the level 1 features for samples. In our experiments, level 1 can be
HMM2Vec, PCA2Vec, or Word2Vec.
Step 2 Divide the data into a training set and feature engineering set. In our
experiments, we divide each family into 500 samples for training and 500 samples
for feature engineering.
Step 3 Train individual PCA model for classes in dataset using training data. In our
experiments, we train 7 PCA model which belongs to 7 malware families.
Step 4 Project samples from feature engineering set into eigenspace of trained PCA
models from Step 3.
Step 5 Calculate the score of a projected sample in the eigenspace of each class.
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Step 6 Create a feature vector with scores from Step 5. Feature vector created in
this space has a length equal to the number of classes in the dataset. In our
experiments, feature vector is of length 7.
Figure 6: 𝑘-PCA Feature Generation
3.3.5.1 Binary PCA Classifier
Before experimenting with 𝑘-PCA, experiments on binary PCA classifier are
conducted which supported use of 𝑘-PCA technique. In binary PCA experiment, we
train the PCA model using 500 samples from one family. The test set consists of 500
positive samples of same family and 500 negative samples of another family.
After training the PCA, we project the test sample into eigenspace and calculate
the minimum euclidean distance from vectors in projected space as a score. Projection
can be tuned by selecting the number of eigenvectors. We experimented by training
the model on one of the family and tested individually against the remaining 6 families.
In each pair of test and train family, we experimented with eigenvectors in range 1 to
20. This results in a total of 7 · 6 · 20 = 840 experiments. For all these experiments,
we calculated accuracy and scatterplot, out of which results for an experiment on
Winwebsec and OnLineGames is shown in Figure 7, 8 and 9.
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Figure 7: Scatterplot for PCA Trained on Winwebsec and Tested on OnLineGames
with 2 Eigenvectors
Figure 8: Scatterplot for PCA Trained on Winwebsec and Tested on OnLineGames
with 19 Eigenvector
As we can see in Figure 7, 8 and 9, increasing the number of eigenvectors in
eigenspace helps to get a clear boundary to classify the sample. Also, it shows that
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Figure 9: AUC vs Number of Eigenvectors
PCA is an effective binary classifier. This forms the basis for using multiple PCA
models in 𝑘-PCA feature engineering technique.
3.3.6 Feature Vector Length
So far we have discussed different techniques to generate the feature vector. The
length of the feature vector is decided based on different parameters. Here, we discuss
the relation of the length of feature vectors and the parameters in the respective
technique.
3.3.6.1 HMM baseline
The feature vector length is decided based on the number of classes. In our
experiments, the length of the feature vector is 7 because of a number of malware
families.
3.3.6.2 HMM2Vec
The feature vector length is based on the number of distinct observation symbols
and the number of states used to train the HMM. The length of the feature vector is
the product of a number of states and the number of observation symbols.
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3.3.6.3 PCA2Vec
The feature vector length is decided based on distinct observation symbols and
the number of significant eigenvectors selected in eigenspace. The resulting length of
the feature vector is a product of both these parameters.
3.3.6.4 k-PCA
The special part about this technique is the reduction of feature vector length
from level 1. The length is independent of feature vector in level 1. Any size of input
feature vector length can be reduced to a feature vector of length 𝑘, where 𝑘 is a
number of the classes.
3.4 Effect of Embedding Length
In our main experiments of PCA2Vec and Word2Vec discussed in Section 3.3,
word embedding is of length 2 for consistency with HMM2Vec. However, it is essential
to know if increasing the size of the embedding vector can result in more information.
We generated embedding vectors of length 20 and window size of 50 for Word2Vec
and PCA2Vec. Results are compared with the vector length 2 and window size 10.
These experiments incorporate 𝑘-PCA to reduce the dimension of the feature vector.
We observed that there is no significant improvement in accuracy when increasing
the length of the feature vector in Figure 10, and the slight improvement comes with
the overhead of dealing with a longer feature vector. Also, the small vector length
does not harm the contextual information, and accuracy is not reduced.
3.5 Classification
The quality of features generated is determined by classification based on features.
We experimented with multi-class classification to assess the feature quality. A
good feature is supposed to yield better results compared to other features. In





























































Figure 10: Effect of Embedding Length
scikitlearn [49] library for all the classifiers. Classification experiments involve two
phases. First, to find the best suitable parameters for training the classifier and the
second phase is training the classifier.
3.5.1 GridSearch Phase
To determine the best possible parameters for a given combination of feature
and classifier, the GridSearch module from scikitlearn is used. Data is divided into a
training set and test set using a train test split module. This module randomly splits
data to 20% as a test set and 80% as a training set. When dividing the data, this
module selects an equal number of samples from each family.
The training set is used to perform GridSearch operation on all possible com-
binations of parameters for a given classifier. When finding the best parameters,
GridSerach divides the training data into 5 folds. GridSearch trains and tests the
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model on those 5 folds and finds the best parameter. The best parameter is decided
based on the combination which gives the highest average of accuracy in each fold.
This phase determines the best suited parameter for a given classifier and feature.
Parameters tested in this phase are listed in Table 6
Table 6: Classifier Hyperparameters Tested
Classifier Hyperparameter Tested values
MLP
learning_rate constant, invscaling, adaptive
hidden_layer_size [(30, 30, 30), (10, 10, 10)]
solver sgd, adam




C [1, 10, 100, 1000]
gamma (rbf only) [0.001, 0.0001]
𝑘NN




n_estimators [30, 100, 500, 1000]
max_depth [5, 8, 15, 25, 30]
min_samples_split [2, 5, 10, 15, 100]
min_samples_leaf [1, 2, 5, 10]
3.5.1.1 GridSearch Results
In this section, we discuss the results of our GridSearch. Table 7 and 8 represents
the best parameters found.
The parameters tested are listed in Table 6. Observe that for each of the three
different word embedding techniques, three 𝑘-PCA techniques, and one baseline tech-
nique, we tested 36 combinations of parameters for MLP, 12 combinations for SVM, 16
combinations for 𝑘NN, and 400 RF combinations. Overall, we conducted
7 · (36 + 12 + 16 + 400) = 3248
experiments to determine the parameters for the remaining experiments.
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Table 7: Classifier Hyperparameters Selected for HMM2Vec, PCA2Vec and Word2Vec
Classifier Hyperparameter HMM2Vec Word2Vec PCA2Vec HMM Baseline
MLP
learning_rate invscaling constant adaptive constant
hidden_layer_size (30, 30, 30) (30, 30, 30) (30, 30, 30) (30, 30, 30)
solver adam adam sgd adam
activation relu relu relu relu
max_iter 10000 10000 10000 10000
SVM
kernel linear rbf rbf rbf
C 1000 1000 1000 10
gamma NA 0.001 0.001 0.0001
𝑘NN
n_neighbors 3 3 3 3
weights distance distance distance distance
p manhatten euclidean manhatten manhatten
RF
n_estimators 100 500 1000 1000
max_depth 25 30 30 30
min_samples_split 2 2 2 2
min_samples_leaf 1 1 1 1
Table 8: Classifier Hyperparameters Selected for 𝑘-PCA Features
Classifier Hyperparameter HMM2Vec Word2Vec PCA2Vec
MLP
learning_rate invscaling constant constant
hidden_layer_size (30, 30, 30) (30, 30, 30) (30, 30, 30)
solver adam sgd adam
activation relu tanh tanh
max_iter 10000 10000 10000
SVM
kernel linear rbf rbf
C 1000 1000 1000
gamma NA 0.001 0.001
𝑘NN
n_neighbors 19 5 11
weights distance distance distance
p euclidean euclidean manhatten
RF
n_estimators 100 500 1000
max_depth 25 15 25
min_samples_split 5 5 2
min_samples_leaf 2 1 2
The optimal parameters selected for each classifier and for each embedding tech-
nique are listed in Table 7 and Table 8. It is observed that overall there is considerable
agreement between the parameters for the different word embedding techniques, but
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in two cases (learning_rate and n_estimators), a different parameter is selected
for each of the three embedding techniques. In 𝑘-PCA version of the feature, different
parameters selected for most cases.
3.5.2 Results
After deciding the best parameters as discussed in Section 3.5.1, we train the
model using training data with best parameters. We calculate the accuracy of the
trained model by classifying the test data. Test data is not used in GridSearch to
avoid biased in finding best parameters. Also, cross-validation in the GridSearch phase
reduces possibility of overfitting the model.
The confusion matrices are generated for a combination of feature vectors and
classifiers. The classification result helps in comparing the quality of feature vector
and the performance of different classifiers. In this section, we discuss the results of
classification for the feature engineering techniques discussed in Section 3.3.
3.5.2.1 HMM Baseline
The confusion matrices for baseline HMM experiments are given in Figure 11
The accuracy achieved for 𝑘NN, MLP, RF, and SVM are 0.92, 0.44, 0.91, and 0.78,
respectively. We observe that MLP and SVM both perform poorly, whereas the
neighborhood-based techniques, namely, 𝑘NN and RF, are both strong, considering
that we have 7 classes. Also, 𝑘NN and RF give very similar results.
3.5.2.2 HMM2Vec Results
From the confusion matrices in Figure 12, we infer that the greatest source of
misclassifications is between FakeRean and Winwebsec families. In many—but not




































0.87 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.02
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0.02 0.93 0.03 0.02
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0.34 0.19 0.05 0.25 0.01 0.16
0.07 0.23 0.07 0.27 0.12 0.24
0.2 0.01 0.07 0.4 0.19 0.13
0.19 0.01 0.54 0.03 0.23
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0.93 0.02 0.03 0.02
0.01 0.02 0.92 0.02 0.01 0.02
0.04 0.04 0.03 0.87 0.01 0.01
0.02 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.89 0.02




















































(c) RF (d) SVM
Figure 11: Confusion Matrices for HMM Baseline Experiments
3.5.2.3 PCA2Vec Results
In the confusion matrices in Figure 13, we give the overall accuracy for each of
our experiments. The results show that PCA2Vec performed poorly for each of the
classifiers, as compared to HMM2Vec.
3.5.2.4 Word2Vec
Analogous to the HMM2Vec and PCA2Vec experiments above, we classify 7000
feature vectors using four classifiers. The confusion matrices for these experiments are
given in Figure 14. From the results in Figure 14, we can infer that the RF seems to
perform particularly well.
3.5.2.5 𝑘-PCA Results
In the 𝑘-PCA experiment, level 1 of the feature can be HMM2Vec, Word2Vec,
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0.95 0.02 0.02 0.01
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0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01
0.87 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.01
0.01 0.93 0.01 0.02 0.03
0.01 0.01 0.82 0.04 0.12
0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.86 0.03 0.01
0.01 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.03 0.86







(c) RF (d) SVM
Figure 12: Confusion Matrices for HMM2Vec Experiments
represent the classification result for three different experiments of 𝑘-PCA based on
level 1 feature. The accuracy of the 𝑘-PCA method with the respective level 1 feature
can be compared in Figure 15. The experiments with the reduced feature vector using
𝑘-PCA show approximately similar results compared to respective word embedding
feature vector. The comparison shows that 𝑘-PCA does not reduce the accuracy after
the reduction of dimensions in the feature vector.
3.5.2.6 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the results of all the feature engineering techniques.
Figure 15 gives the overall accuracy for each of our multi-class experiments using
𝑘NN, MLP, RF, and SVM classifiers, for each of the HMM baseline, HMM2Vec,
PCA2Vec, Word2Vec, and 𝑘-PCA derived features. From these 28 distinct results, we
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(c) RF (d) SVM
Figure 13: Confusion Matrices for PCA2Vec Experiments
behind. This relation between feature embedding techniques holds after dimensionality
reduction using 𝑘-PCA.
We also see that the neighborhood-based classifiers, namely, RF and 𝑘NN, perform
better than SVM and MLP classifiers. In general, we expect that RF and 𝑘NN would
perform similarly to each other, and that SVM and MLP would perform similarly as
well. Another observation is 𝑘-PCA level of feature engineering gives almost same
results as level 1. However, the length of the feature vector in 𝑘-PCA is less than the
level 1 feature. This shows that 𝑘-PCA reduces the dimension of the feature vector
without affecting the performance.
3.6 Overfitting in 𝑘NN and RF
We performed additional experiments on the baseline HMM, HMM2Vec, and
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(c) RF (d) SVM
Figure 14: Confusion Matrices for Word2Vec Experiments
RF. For both the experiments, we performed 10 fold cross-validation and used the
average accuracy of all folds to smooth any bias that might appear in the results
for the various folds. For our 𝑘NN experiments, we tested the number of nearest
neighbors 𝑘 in the range 1 to 150 with a step size of 5. For our RF experiments, we
trained RF with the maximum depth of the tree in the range 1 to 30, and the number
of trees ranging from 1 to 500, with a step size of 5 for both parameters.
Figure 16, 18, and 17 show the results for these experiments. RF results in
Figure 17 and Figure 18 are truncated to make graph readable. Based on the results in
Figure 15, the baseline HMM feature performs poorly in MLP and SVM classification
and better with RF and 𝑘NN classifier. Features such as Word2Vec and HMM2Vec



































































































































Figure 15: Accuracy for Various Features and Classifiers
In Figures 7 and 8, it is observed that GridSearchCV chooses a small 𝑘 in 𝑘NN, a
large number of estimators, and a large max depth of tree for RF in most cases. This
leads to analyze the effects of parameters in 𝑘NN and RF against strong and weak
features. This experiment will help us to identify if there are any potential over-fitting
issues in 𝑘NN and RF for weak features.
In Figure 16, it is observed that the increasing value of 𝑘 in 𝑘NN for weak feature
increases the misclassification rate drastically. The graph is steeper for the HMM
baseline than HMM2Vec and Word2Vec. Similarly, in Figure 17 and Figure 18, 3d
graphs shows that the increasing number of trees for short tress is helping to reduce
the misclassification rate more effectively with HMM2Vec features compared to the
baseline HMM feature. Decision boundary for a trained model should be smooth if
learning (As opposed to memorizing) is taking place. HMM baseline results with
𝑘NN and RF show irregular boundary as changing the training parameters radically
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Figure 16: 𝑘NN Results as a Function of 𝑘
changes the misclassification rate. Hence we can say that classifier for HMM baseline
features is overfitting for small values of 𝑘 in 𝑘NN and large number of trees in RF.






























































Conclusion and Future Work
In this research, we conducted experiments to understand the significance of word
embedding techniques for feature engineering. We considered word embedding tech-
niques, including Word2Vec, HMM2Vec, and PCA2Vec. We used opcode sequence as
a basic feature of malware and considered 7 different malware families for classification,
with a substantial number of samples for each family. We extracted the opcode using
the objdump tool in Linux and filtered the most important opcodes from samples.
We also used a balanced dataset with 1000 samples in each family to avoid biased in
experiments.
In this paper, we have presented the results of several experiments using word
embedding techniques to generate features for malware family classification. In effect,
we have applied machine learning techniques to generate results that are subsequently
used as features for additional machine learning techniques. Such a concept is not
entirely unprecedented as, for example, PCA is often used to reduce the dimensionality
of data before applying other machine learning techniques. However, the authors are
not aware of previous work involving the use of word embedding techniques in the
manner considered in this work.
Our results show that word embedding techniques can be used to generate
features that are more informative than the original data. This process of distilling
useful information from the data before classifying samples is potentially useful, not
only in the field of malware analysis but also in other fields where learning plays
a prominent role. The experiments show that random restarts in HMM2Vec are
effective in learning of word embeddings. In a comparative study of word embedding
techniques, we conclude that HMM2Vec and Word2Vec perform similar whereas
PCA2Vec performs poorly.
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We also performed binary classification experiments on malware families in our
dataset using the PCA model. From this experiment, we derived that the families in the
dataset are separable and PCA scores can be used as a feature. Based on the results of
PCA as a binary classifier, we proposed 𝑘-PCA technique to reduce the dimensionality
of the feature vector which no other research has explored before. Results in the
experiments show that 𝑘-PCA can be used effectively to reduce dimensions of the
feature vector. We considered four different classifiers in our experiment SVM, MLP,
𝑘NN, and RF for classification and observed that results in SVM and MLP are related.
For future work, it would be interesting to consider other families and different
types of malware. It would also be interesting work to use more complex and higher
dimensional data—as with dimensionality-reduction techniques, such data would
tend to offer more prospects for improvement using the word embedding strategy
considered in this paper. Also, the robustness of the models can be analyzed by
checking the effect of obfuscation on the word embedding techniques. The word
embedding techniques can be used with features such a byte code n-gram, system
API calls etc. as we only consider opcode in this study. Another direction to explore
is to use the contextual information from word embedding for a task other than
classification such as unsupervised clustering. Spherical 𝑘-means can be used for
clustering based on word embeddings.
Our experiments are done on malware families of different types, hence experiments
can be extended on malware families of the same type to understand the patterns
within the same type of malware. In all our word embeddings, instead of generating
feature vector, images can be generated and a deep learning model can be trained for
classification using those images. In our experiments, feature selection is based on
the frequency of opcodes. Research can be extended to use advanced feature selection
techniques based on TF-IDF and SVM, for example.
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Figure A.19: AUC vs Number of Eigenvectors for Top 20 Opcodes in PCA Binary
Classification
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(c) RF (d) SVM
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Figure A.26: Confusion Matrices for 𝑘-PCA with PCA2Vec
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